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Expansive Interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act
In Henderson v. Stalder, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) of 1937 prevents the federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over any case in which a victory for the plaintiff might
reduce state revenues.2 In reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit did more than
diminish its own power: It gave state legislatures a potentially powerful tool to
insulate their actions from constitutional review in the federal courts. The Fifth
Circuit's holding is troubling because it threatens the ability of the federal
courts to fulfill their historic role in safeguarding rights created under federal
law.3
This Comment argues that Henderson was wrongly decided. By holding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims, the Fifth Circuit
needlessly limited the power of the federal courts vis-a'-vis state legislatures and
opened a door to state legislatures intentionally crafting legislation so that it
will be immune from review in the federal courts. Part I describes the
legislative program the plaintiffs challenged in Henderson. Part II argues that in
reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit not only critically misinterpreted
existing Supreme Court precedent, 4 but also gave the TIA a construction that is
1. 407 F. 3 d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). Judge Edith H. Jones authored the opinion, and was joined on
the panel by Judges E. Grady Jolly and Edward Charles Prado.
2. Id. at 360; see also TIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
3. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 18o (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one reason
1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, . . . the claims of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.").
4. In 2004, the Supreme Court defined the appropriate scope of the TIA. Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88 (2004). For additional discussion of Hibbs, and Henderson's interpretation of it, see
infra Part II.
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at odds with the enacting Congress's intent. Part III discusses the dangerous
possibility that the Fifth Circuit's abdication of jurisdiction will spur states to
structure legislative programs as "taxes" specifically to insulate them from
constitutional review in the federal courts.
I. THE LOUISIANA PRESTIGE LICENSE PLATE PROGRAM
A 1999 Louisiana law authorized the Secretary of the state's Department of
Public Corrections and Safety to create "a special prestige license plate" that
would "bear the legend 'Choose Life." In addition to the regular motor vehicle
license fee, each applicant for the plate was required to pay $25, as well as a
handling fee that would partially offset administrative costs. 6 The legislation
provided that these fees would be placed into a "Choose Life" fund. Qualifying
organizations that provided adoption and pregnancy-counseling services could
submit grant applications to receive a portion of the funds.'
Louisiana citizens and Planned Parenthood of America challenged the
statute, alleging that it violated the First Amendment by not authorizing the
creation of a pro-choice license plate. The district court held for the plaintiffs
and enjoined production of the license plates.8 In the district court's view, the
government's authorization of the special license plate had created a forum for
speech, and its refusal to permit pro-choice license plates was impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district
court's decision, but failed to reach the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional
claim. Instead, it concluded that the TIA, which bars federal courts from
enjoining the collection of "any tax,"1" deprived the federal court of jurisdiction
and prevented it from reaching the merits of the constitutional challenge.1 The
s. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 4 7 :4 63.61.A (Supp. 2005). The Secretary could only authorize the
plate if at least one hundred people requested it. Id.
6. Id. § 47:463.61.C.
7. Id. § 47:463.61.F.
8. Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003), rev'd 407 F. 3 d 351 (5th Cir.
2005).
9. Id. at 717-18.
1o TIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
ii. Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5 th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit had previously
"remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of standing
unless the plaintiff Keeler [one of the individual plaintiffs] amends her petition within a
reasonable time to challenge the state's overall policy and practice of issuing specialty license
plates." Henderson v. Stalder, S7 F. App'x 213 (sth Cir. Jan. 9, 2003) (unpublished order)
(per curiam). In response, Keeler amended her complaint, and the district court determined
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Fifth Circuit defined the term "tax" broadly to include any "extraction of
property from a private person by a sovereign for its use,"'" and concluded that
the license plate charges at issue fell within that definition. Thus, the court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss. 3 Although
the plaintiffs could bring their claims in state court, they would be foreclosed
from renewing their claims in federal court unless the state court system failed
to provide them with a forum in which they could raise their constitutional
challenge.' 4 After the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion, the Henderson plaintiffs
requested that the Fifth Circuit rehear the case en banc. As of September 2005,
that petition is pending; the plaintiffs have not yet decided whether they would
appeal an adverse decision to the Supreme Court."5
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
In recognizing the TIA as a jurisdictional bar to hearing the plaintiffs'
claims in Henderson, the Fifth Circuit gave the statute a broad application that
Congress did not intend and other federal courts have deemed inappropriate.
Before Congress enacted the TIA, many states required taxpayers who believed
that she had met the Fifth Circuit's requirements for standing. Henderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d at
710.
12. Henderson, 407 F.3d at 356. In addition, the court of appeals distinguished between taxes and
fees on the basis of a number of different factors, holding that "the classic tax sustains the
essential flow of revenue to the government," is enacted by the legislature, and benefits the
entire community. Id. In contrast, the district court had concluded that the payment that
accompanied selection of the "Choose Life" plate was a "fee," rather than a "tax," primarily
because individuals paid it voluntarily and the amount of the charge varied. Henderson, 265
F. Supp. 2d at 720 F1.12. The district court stated that the defendants' citation to a case
applying the TIA "border[ed] on the absurd." Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized
factors considered by both courts. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415
U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) ("Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress [may tax] . . .
solely on ability to pay .... A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a request that
a public agency permit an applicant to practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a
broadcast station. The public agency performing those services normally may exact a fee for
a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other members
of society." (footnote omitted)).
13. Henderson, 407 F.3 d at 360.
14. See Smith v. Travis County Educ. Dist., 968 F.2d 453, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Tax
Injunction Act bars the district court from asserting jurisdiction unless the State fails to
supply a plain, speedy and efficient remedy for the taxpayers' claim. The inquiry into
whether a plain, speedy and efficient remedy exists focuses on whether a state provides a
procedural vehicle that affords taxpayers the opportunity to raise their federal constitutional
claims.").
is. See Telephone Interview with Sanford Cohen, Deputy Dir., Domestic Legal Program, Ctr.
for Reprod. Rights, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 19, 2005).
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that a tax was invalid to pay the tax before they could challenge its validity in
court.' 6 Out-of-state taxpayers, however, could bring diversity suits in federal
court, and the federal courts could then enjoin the state from collecting the
taxes while the federal lawsuit was pending.
To prevent this perceived unfairness,' 7 Congress enacted the TIA, which
prohibits federal courts from "enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state. ', s According to a
Senate report, the TIA was intended to serve two different, but related,
purposes: (1) to "eliminate disparities" between out-of-state and in-state
taxpayers, and (2) "to stop taxpayers, with the aid of a federal injunction, from
withholding large sums, thereby disrupting state government finances. ' 9
Because the TIA was enacted in response to individuals who wanted to use
the federal courts to delay the payment of their personal taxes, such as sales
and property taxes, courts have long limited its applicability to that context.2"
In Hibbs v. Winn, the Supreme Court sanctioned this interpretation when it
held that the TIA applies only "in cases Congress wrote the Act to address, i.e.,
cases in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to avoid
paying state taxes."2 Hibbs thus affirms a commonsense and longstanding
16. H.R. REP. No. 75-1503, at 2 (1937), cited in Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 523
(1981).
17. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 522 n.29 (suggesting that the TIA was enacted in large part to "prevent
out-of-state corporations, through diversity suits, from delaying payment of state taxes
during the pendency of federal litigation while in-state citizens would have to pay first and
then litigate in state courts").
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). Congress actually modeled the TIA after the Anti-Injunction Act
(AIA), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2000), which prohibits "any court" from hearing a suit brought
to "restrain[] the assessment or collection of any [federal] tax." The Supreme Court has
recognized that the AIA serves two purposes: "It responds to the Government's need to
assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement
judicial interference; and it require[s] that the legal right to the disputed sums be
determined in a suit for refund." Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
19. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 104 (construing S. REP. No. 75-1035, at 1 (1937)); see also S. REP. No. 75-
1035, at i (1937) ("It is the common practice for statutes of the various States to forbid
actions in State courts to enjoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is
invalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes generally provide that
taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest. This
type of State legislation makes it possible for the States and their various agencies to survive
while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress.").
2o. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 105-o6 (listing cases in which the TIA has been applied).
21. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 107. In Hibbs, plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge to an
Arizona law that authorized income tax credits for payments to organizations that award
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exception to TIA preemption: The TIA does not preempt federal jurisdiction
when the taxpayer is a third party who is not attempting to avoid payment of
taxes .2
The Henderson opinion is at odds with both congressional intent and
Supreme Court precedent. Even if the fee associated with the Louisiana license
plate program is a "tax," the Fifth Circuit should have recognized that this
challenge fell within the exception recognized in Hibbs.23 The Henderson court,
however, concluded that the Hibbs exception applied only to situations in
which: "(1) a third party (not the taxpayer) files suit, and (2) the suit's success
will enrich, not deplete, the government entity's coffers." 4 But the court failed
to recognize that although both factors were present in the Hibbs case, it was
the first, and not the second, that was critical to the Supreme Court's decision.
In Henderson, the plaintiffs were not attempting to avoid or defer paying taxes,
and the fees attached to the license plate program were not a critical part of the
Louisiana tax system.s Given Congress's intent in enacting the TIA, the fact
that the plaintiffs' successful pursuit of their claim would slightly reduce state
revenue should not change the result. 6 By ruling that even a nominal decrease
educational scholarships and tuition grants to children attending private schools, including
schools that provide religious instruction or give admissions preferences based on religion.
Id. at 2281. The Court considered both the legislative history and the language of the TIA
and determined that it should not apply to all cases in which a state tax was challenged.
22. Id. at i1o ("[N]umerous federal-court decisions- including decisions of this Court
reviewing lower federal-court judgments-have reached the merits of third-party
constitutional challenges to tax benefits without mentioning the TIA.").
23. The Fifth Circuit recognized the potential applicability of that exception, but unnecessarily
circumscribed its scope. Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3 d 351, 359 (5 th Cir. 2005) ("Even
though the specialty plate charges may be considered taxes within the scope of TIA, the
federal courts may entertain [the plaintiffs'] suit if it falls within the Supreme Court's recent
discussion of the TIA in Hibbs.").
24. Henderson, 407 F. 3d at 359. At least two other courts have followed the Henderson court's
lead. In a challenge to similar license plate programs in Oklahoma and Ohio, district courts
held that the TIA deprived them of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. See NARAL Pro-
Choice Ohio v. Taft, No. 1:o5 CV 1o64, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21394, at *20 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 27, 2005) (describing Henderson as "persuasive"); Hill v. Kemp, No. 4:04-cv-00028-
CVE-PJC, slip op. at 4 n.3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing Henderson for the proposition
that the Hibbs exception only applies when a third party files suit and the suit's success will
not diminish state revenue).
25. The Hibbs Court also noted that the TIA was designed "to stop taxpayers . . . from
withholding large sums, thereby disrupting state government finances." Hibbs, 542 U.S. at
104. If the Fifth Circuit wanted to base its holding on language from the Hibbs opinion, it
could have easily quoted this language and required the state to show that ending the license
plate program would "disrupt state government finances."
26. It seems strange to condition the TIA's applicability primarily on whether a successful suit
would increase or decrease state tax revenues. Under the Henderson court's view, a tax cut or
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in state revenue requires federal preemption under the TIA, the Fifth Circuit
expanded the breadth of TIA preemption beyond taxpayers attempting to
avoid paying taxes to embrace plaintiffs' challenges to state programs that raise
just a small amount of money.
III. THE DANGEROUS DOOR
By holding that federal courts cannot hear challenges to state programs that
have the potential to raise revenue for the state, the Fifth Circuit provided state
legislatures with a powerful tool to prevent individuals from challenging the
constitutionality of state legislative programs in federal courts.27 When a state
in the Fifth Circuit wants to pass a law that it fears might be held
unconstitutional," or even one that it knows is unconstitutional,' 9 all it need
do is attach a "fee" whose proceeds "benefit[] the entire community."3 Under
tax exemption, which would reduce state tax revenues, could be challenged and enjoined in
federal court, despite the fact that the suit could interfere with the state's economic
policies - the sort of disruption the TIA was designed to prevent.
27. At least one nonprofit organization has heralded the Fifth Circuit decision and called for
other limitations on federal court jurisdiction over Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g.,
America's Future, Court Monitor: Judge Jones Saves Life by Limiting Jurisdiction,
http://www.americasfuture.net/courtmonitor/2oo5/2005-5-29.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2005) ("Judges should welcome similar proposed bans on their passing judgment on
references to God and depictions of the Ten Commandments.").
28. The Louisiana program at issue in Henderson likely is unconstitutional. It is well established
that government cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("[G]overnment regulation may not
favor one speaker over another."). But that is exactly what the Louisiana legislature did
when it created a forum in which individuals could express pro-life views but not pro-choice
ones. Indeed, not only had the district court determined that this program was
unconstitutional, Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003), but the Fourth
Circuit had held previously that a similar South Carolina program violated the First
Amendment. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
Although South Carolina also assessed a fee on those who wanted the special plates, id. at
788, the defendants in that case do not appear to have argued that TIA preemption applied.
29. Indeed, a state legislature may declare that the federal courts in its jurisdiction have failed to
interpret state law correctly. See, e.g., H.R Con. Res. 39, Reg. Sess. (La. 2005) (disapproving
of a federal district court decision holding that it was unconstitutional to open school board
meetings with prayer). In this resolution, the Louisiana House of Representatives expressed
its view about what the Framers intended the First Amendment to mean and invoked the
1983 Supreme Court decision Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), to support its view
that the district court's decision was incorrect. Although in this case Louisiana expressed its
disagreement with this declaration, the Henderson court's decision provides the Louisiana
legislature, and other state legislatures, with a much more powerful tool to express their
disagreement with the federal courts.
3o. Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Henderson, that fee will be viewed as a "tax," and its existence will preclude the
federal courts from hearing the case.3" The possibilities are numerous. States
could violate the Equal Protection Clause by requiring certain classes of
individuals to pay taxes before receiving specific benefits from the state; states
could subsidize or support a religious program that would violate the
Establishment Clause, but require participants to pay a tax; and states could
violate the Due Process Clause by requiring individuals to pay taxes to obtain
an abortion or purchase contraceptives or exercise other fundamental rights.3"
In all of these cases, Fifth Circuit plaintiffs could be denied access to federal
courts. Although the TIA jurisdictional bar does not preclude litigants from
bringing their constitutional claims, it does make it more difficult for them to
do so. For litigants who initially bring their challenge in federal courts and
subsequently confront the TIA bar, the costs (monetary and otherwise) of
renewing their claims in state court after many years of litigation in the federal
system may be prohibitive. But even if the litigants do bring their claims in
state court, they are still denied the opportunity to have their federal claims
heard in a federal forum,33 and they may face more difficulty vindicating their
constitutional rights for that reason.34 If Henderson or a similar case reaches the
31. While "what is a 'tax' for purposes of the TIA is a question of federal law on which a state's
legislative label has no bearing," id. at 356, a state could easily structure a program so that it
would be classified as a tax under the Fifth Circuit's broad definition. See supra note iI.
32. Although the Equal Protection Clause problem might be remedied by a suit seeking to
impose the "tax" on everyone, and such a suit would not raise a TIA problem, see Henderson,
407 F.3d at 359, the more obvious litigation strategy would be to seek to eliminate the tax.
The Establishment Clause and Due Process Clause problems could only be fixed by
eliminating the program or tax, which would certainly raise a TIA issue.
33. A belief that federal courts play a special role in protecting federal rights has been expressed
by a number of judges and commentators. See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 500
(1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that there must be some federal forum available
in which individuals can sue state officials); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 9o HARv. L.
REv. 1105, 1110 (1977) (arguing that "institutional factors" continue to lead "lawyers and
judges" to doubt the parity between the federal and state court systems in enforcing federal
rights).
34. While state judges generally act consistently with their obligation to uphold the Federal
Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, state judges are subject to pressures that federal
judges do not face because many state judges are elected to office and do not serve life terms.
See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POL. 427, 428 (1992) (concluding that state supreme court justices "who have views
contrary to those of the voters and the court majority, and who face competitive electoral
conditions will vote with the court majority instead of dissenting on politically volatile
issues"); see also S. Christian Leadership Conference, La. Chapter v. Supreme Court, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1999) ("[I]n Louisiana, where state judges are elected, one
cannot claim complete surprise when political pressure somehow manifests itself within the
judiciary."). The pressures on state court judges to succumb to public opinion may be
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Supreme Court, the Court should embrace the opportunity to clarify the
appropriate scope of the TIA. Only by doing so can the Court ensure that the
federal courts limit their application of the TIA to the class of cases it was
intended to cover-those in which individuals or corporations contest their
own tax bill. That application is broad enough to protect the states' ability to
raise revenue, but narrow enough to preserve the federal courts' role in
protecting federal rights.
BRIANNE J. GOROD
particularly great in cases involving politically volatile issues, which may be the same issues
that would lead state legislatures to try to prevent federal court review.
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